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N     D   
Laundering ‘‘money’’:
on the need for conceptual clarity
within the sociology of money
Introduction
D      the past decade or so there has been a growing interest in
the changing nature of money. Researchers have been looking into the
emergence of new monetary forms: for example, ‘‘complementary cur-
rencies’’ (Bowring ; Fitzpatrick and Caldwell ; Latouche ;
Lee ; North , , ) and internet or electronic monies
(Pahl ; Singh , , , ). This research is supported
by the work of Cohen (, ), Helleiner () and Hart (),
who predict that the relationship between money and the state is coming
under increasing threat from these new monetary forms. But for all the
empirical richness that these recent contributions add to our under-
standing of money, they have further complicated what was already
something of a conceptual muddle. This muddle has arisen because
there is no common view of what counts as ‘‘money’’ in a more general
sense. There never has been a consensus about this: the extant literature
on money is replete with debates over competing deﬁnitions. But now,
perhaps for the ﬁrst time, some scholars are suggesting that there is no
feasible deﬁnition of money which can embrace the diversity of mone-
tary forms in circulation. It seems that the problem today is not that we
cannot agree on a deﬁnition of money, but rather that no single deﬁnition
of money will suﬀice. ‘‘Money’’, it would appear, is disintegrating. The
terms of the present debate suggest that any attempt to build a coherent
theoretical conception of money is bound to fail.
My aim in this paper is to attempt a careful assessment of the analy-
tical implications of this purported disintegration of ‘‘money’’. The
paper is in four sections. In the ﬁrst, I examine the diverse nature of
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money. Until recently, the world’s monetary system was dominated by
national currency. This domination is now held to be in decline due to
the growth of private monetary forms such as ‘‘electronic money’’ and
‘‘alternative currency’’. I ask whether these developments really do jus-
tify claims about the ‘‘de-territorialization’’ of money. In the second
section, I interrogate Ingham’s argument that states have an essential
political function in relation to money that cannot be superseded by
private corporations or community associations. I demonstrate that
while Ingham provides an insightful analysis of state-issued currency,
his argument is ﬂawed as a general approach to the nature of money. In
the third section, I utilise the distinction between currency and money to
evaluate the arguments of Zelizer and Hart, who have both sought to
account for the ‘‘multiplicity’’ of money. Although they agree that
money is a diverse phenomenon, there are some important diﬀerences
between their approaches. Zelizer advances a phenomenological account
of the multiple meanings of money. Hart goes further, arguing that
money is diverse as an entity. To conclude, I propose how these various
approaches might be reconciled around a generic ¢ but essentially ﬁc-
tional ¢ concept of money.
Breaking-Up Money
The so-called disintegration of money can be described in a number
of ways, depending on how one deﬁnes ‘‘money’’. Broadly speaking, it is
possible to distinguish between three kinds of money that now circulate:
currencies that are issued by a state (or group of states); forms of money
(usually consisting of e-money) that are issued and managed by corp-
orations; and forms of money that are issued by local communities.
There is widespread agreement among sociologists, anthropologists and
geographers that the second and third categories have grown in their
signiﬁcance during the past decade. There is also some consensus that
this growth could undermine the integrity of a global monetary system
that is managed primarily by governments. But these two developments
¢ the growth of alternatives to currency on the one hand, and the decline
of state control over the world’s monetary system on the other ¢ tend to
be grouped together as part of an underlying trend towards the ‘‘de-
territorialization of money’’. I argue that they are best treated separately.




The phenomenon of ‘‘de-territorialization’’ has been explored by
Cohen in two widely-cited books as well as in numerous articles on the
‘‘changing geography of money’’. According to Cohen, we are witness-
ing the decline of what he calls ‘‘pure territorial money’’. ‘‘Pure terri-
torial money’’ refers to money that is used solely and universally within a
particular national territory. It is issued by state decree, and controlled
by agencies acting on behalf of the state. Increasingly, major currencies
are circulating beyond their territorial borders. Moreover, some weaker
currencies are being encroached upon and are even disappearing from
circulation altogether. In some respects, the issues raised by de-territo-
rialization are not new. ‘‘Weak’’ or ‘‘soft’’ currencies have been around
for a long time. The diﬀiculty of controlling a currency that circulates
beyond the territory in which it is legal tender has been apparent at least
since the oil-driven growth of ‘‘euro-dollars’’ during the mid- to late-
s. In any case, one should not exaggerate the extent to which
governments have been free at any point to manipulate monetary policy
in the face of international pressures and other economic complexities.
Nevertheless, there is some justiﬁcation for claiming that the problem of
currency management for states has deepened during the past twenty
years or so. There are three main reasons for this deepening: ﬁrst, the
liberalization and subsequent expansion of international money and
ﬁnancial markets; second, the increasing use of major currencies beyond
the legal jurisdiction of their respective authorities, whatever the prefe-
rences of governments; and third, the increasing incidence of ‘‘dollari-
zation’’, (where a government chooses to adopt a foreign currency in
place of its own) ().
Cohen’s analysis of the de-territorialization of money hinges on what
he calls a ‘‘revival of currency competition’’. This revival has been
spurred by ﬁnancial markets, which enable banks and corporations to
choose from a range of national currencies. Increasingly, governments
are unable to ‘‘preserve the exclusivity of their currencies’’, and ‘‘cur-
rency choice is... becoming the rule’’ (Cohen , p. ). According to
Cohen, currency competition has led to two interrelated phenomena:
currency internationalization, and currency substitution. Currency inter-
nationalization occurs when a major currency (such as the US dollar)
() Monetary sovereignty might also have
been recently undermined for another reason
that is partly related to the issues just men-
tioned. Monetary unions and currency boards
are partially motivated by the desire of
governments to bolster their own monetary
arrangements against the perceived power and
apparent autonomy of ﬁnancial markets. In
addition to the euro, there are three other cur-
rency unions in existence: in the East Carib-
bean (established in ), the CFA Franc
Zone (-) and the Common Monetary
Area (). Both of the latter are African. In
all, thirty-ﬁve countries worldwide currently




circulates beyond the legal jurisdiction of its issuing authority. Currency
substitution ¢ or what is sometimes called ‘‘dollarization’’ ¢ takes place
when a minor currency is encroached upon, and even replaced
altogether, by an internationalized currency. In eﬀect, currency inter-
nationalization and currency substitution constitute ‘‘a sort of
Gresham’s-Law-in-reverse... a Darwinian process of natural selection,
driven above all by the force of market demand’’ (ibid., p. ). The
consequence of these two processes is that the monetary landscape is
becoming increasingly stratiﬁed. Cohen illustrates this through an anal-
ogy with a pyramid, which is ‘‘narrow at the top, where the strongest
currencies dominate; and increasingly broad below, reﬂecting varying
degrees of competitive inferiority’’ (ibid., p. ) ().
Currency internationalization and currency substitution are only
indicative of a dilution of monetary sovereignty, and not of its complete
erosion. Nevertheless, this prospect gives rise to two possibilities. One
possibility is that fewer and fewer currencies will circulate, as the world’s
monetary system evolves towards a hypothetical state in which only one
currency ¢ controlled by an institution such as a world central bank ¢
exists. This possibility has been explored, and is indeed advocated, by
Mundell (). Cohen (, p. ) concedes that the ‘‘one world, one
money’’ scenario is attractive if one takes demand-side considerations
into account: ‘‘eﬀiciency considerations suggest a preference for as small
a population of monies as possible’’. However, the situation is more
complex on the supply side. States are likely to seek to retain their power
over currency in order to continue receiving the beneﬁts that such
control yields for macroeconomic policy: seniorage, political symbolism,
and monetary insulation (ibid., pp. -) (). Thus, according to
Cohen, the ‘‘streamlining’’ of the world’s monetary system that is sug-
gested by the processes of internationalization and currency substitution
() In Cohen’s view, the pyramid consists of
‘‘top currency’’, which is most widely accepted
beyond its borders (formerly the pound, now
the US dollar), ‘‘patrician currency’’, which is
used for cross-border transactions, but not on
such a wide scale (e.g. the euro and yen), ‘‘elite
currency’’, which is used internationally but
has a limited international inﬂuence (e.g. ster-
ling, Swiss franc, Australian dollar), ‘‘plebeian
currency’’, which enjoys a very limited inter-
national use (e.g. the currencies of Norway,
Sweden, Israel, South Korea, Taiwan,
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates),
‘‘permeated currency’’, whose domestic com-
petitiveness has been compromised through
currency substitution (e.g. currencies in Latin
America, former Soviet Bloc, Southeast Asia),
‘‘quasi-currency’’, which has been superseded
not only as store of value but also as unit of
account and medium of exchange (e.g. the
currencies of Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Cambodia,
Laos, Peru), and ‘‘pseudo-currency’’, which
exists in name only (e.g. the Panamanian bal-
boa) (Cohen , pp. -).
() He also argues that the most likely
corollary of the idea of a world currency, i.e. an
institution along the lines of a world central
bank, is unrealistic: the governments that are
responsible for the major currencies such as the
US dollar and the euro are unlikely to accept
such a proposal (Cohen , pp. -).
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will be oﬀset by a combination of domestic pressures and market forces.
The world’s monetary system is changing quite radically. But it will be
characterised by a rise, not a fall, in the diversity of money (ibid., p. ).
In Cohen’s view, it is the increasing diversity of the world’s monetary
system that presents the greatest potential diﬀiculties to governments.
State-issued currencies are facing competition not only from each
other, but also from a growing range of monetary forms which are not
issued by states, such as electronic money and complementary curren-
cies. Cohen argues that the diversity of money is likely to increase by
virtue of this new competition. Electronic money, or e-money, is most
often used in specialised payment networks as an incentive for regular
customers. Prominent examples of these monetary forms include air
miles () and supermarket loyalty schemes. Corporate incentive sche-
mes are becoming more sophisticated, powerful and far-reaching. In
Britain, one recent example of this development is the ‘‘Nectar’’ scheme.
This incorporates companies in a range of diﬀerent sectors, such as
Sainsbury’s (groceries), Barclaycard (credit cards), Vodaphone (mobile
phones), BP (petroleum), Hertz (car hire) and E-Energy (electricity and
gas). The points that consumers accrue can be converted into air miles,
used online to buy consumer durables and package holidays, or
exchanged for entry into theme parks and cinemas. The Tesco ‘‘Club-
card’’ ¢ the main rival to that scheme ¢ is integrated into the super-
market’s ﬁnancial arm, which oﬀers a full range of retail banking servi-
ces.
If electronic money is having a growing impact on ‘‘mainstream’’
money-ﬂows, there are grounds to suspect that the state’s predominance
in the control of money is also being undermined in a more localised
sense. ‘‘Complementary’’ or ‘‘alternative’’ currencies include LETS
(Local Exchange Trading System), green dollars, and Ithaca hours.
They are generally, but not exclusively, associated with economic regen-
eration in the developing world and within impoverished communities
in western societies. Alternative currencies are often linked to ecological
concerns (see Helleiner ) although anti-state, anti-capitalist and
even neo-liberal rationales have also been advanced for establishing
these small-scale monetary systems (). The ﬁrst LETS was established
on Vancouver Island in . The development of these systems acce-
() Lietaer refers to these monetary forms as
‘‘corporate scrip’’, and suggests that they are
‘‘currencies in the making for the ‘international
travelling elite’’’ (Cohen , p. ).
() Within the academic literature, local
forms of money have been viewed as a coun-
terweight to global capitalism (Pacione ),
as an important tool of local economic devel-
opment (North , ; Seyfang ), and
as a vital means of ‘‘community-building’’
(Glover ; Lee ; Seyfang ).
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lerated during the s, and there are now at least two thousand com-
plementary currencies in operation worldwide.
In the majority of cases, complementary currencies circulate outside
the mainstream monetary system. Indeed, one might regard their crea-
tion as a direct consequence of ‘‘ﬁnancial exclusion’’. Those who join
such schemes tend to be unemployed: they have limited reserves of legal
tender, and may have been denied access to credit from major commer-
cial sources. The largest LETS in the UK, based in Manchester, has
been integrated into the mainstream (or formal) economy to some
extent. The ‘‘bobbins’’ which circulate within the system are accepted
by some local businesses. In contrast to many LETS, transactions that
are denominated in Manchester’s ‘‘bobbins’’ are subjected to sales and
income tax. But in most instances, those responsible for administering
LETS have actively sought to insulate them against the oﬀicial currency
system. They almost invariably have their own unit of denomination:
frequently, they are named to reﬂect the region in which they circulate
(e.g. ‘‘tales’’ in Canterbury). There are a number of possible reasons for
deliberately avoiding links with the oﬀicial currency: for example, to
avoid being caught up in inﬂation, to evade taxation by rendering trans-
actions diﬀicult to convert into the oﬀicial unit of account, and to
underwrite the ‘‘local’’ colour of the money itself.
Electronic money might constitute a ‘‘threat’’ to state control over
money: primarily, because of the potential scale of its circulation. But
no-one has seriously suggested that e-money will ever replace state-
issued currency. In this respect, Cohen is justiﬁed in arguing that
e-money will increase the diversity of money and present governments
with new policy challenges. But with complementary currencies, quite
diﬀerent questions arise. If the future of money is driven by the logic of
currency competition as Cohen suggests, alternative currencies are
unlikely to survive. Indeed, the evidence shows that they often fail. Not
only are they inherently vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour, but the
division of labour within a particular community may not be suﬀiciently
complex to allow a dense network of exchanges to develop (Wolters
, p. ). However, given that they are intended to meet a distinctive
set of policy objectives in their own right, these currencies do not com-
pete with so much as complement state-issued currency. Similarly to
electronic money, localized monetary forms fulﬁll a highly speciﬁc
function. But unlike e-money, they are likely to have only a strictly
limited sphere of circulation. One might say that they circulate within
the interstices of state-issued currency: Cohen (, p. ), for
example, describes them as ‘‘a spreading archipelago within the func-
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tional domains of individual national monies’’. But if we are seeking an
explanation of this spread, the concept of currency competition will not
provide it.
These observations are indicative of a deeper problem in Cohen’s
approach: his analysis of money runs two separate issues together. The
ﬁrst issue concerns the ability of governments to manage their own
currencies. Cohen addresses this directly with proposals for how states
might deal with the problems of currency internationalization and cur-
rency substitution (). The second issue concerns a decline in the
signiﬁcance of currency as a kind of money. This is raised by Cohen’s
treatment of e-money and alternative currencies, but it cannot be dealt
with by an approach which is so narrowly concerned with problems of
monetary governance. The de-territorialization of money as he deﬁnes it
does not refer to a decline in the signiﬁcance of state-issued currency
relative to other monetary forms such as e-money and complementary
currency. Rather, it refers to the erosion of the ability of states to manage
the currencies which they produce. In addition, de-territorialization
refers to a variety of threats to the capacity of national governments
to use monetary policy as an eﬀective instrument of macroeconomic
policy.
Cohen treats ‘‘money’’ as if it was synonymous with ‘‘currency’’ ¢ and
does not deﬁne either term. Instead, he appears to be utilising the
conventional economic deﬁnition of money as ‘‘a medium of exchange,
store of value and unit of account’’. However, the ‘‘currency pyramid’’
which he describes does not include e-money or complementary cur-
rency; indeed, it consists only of monetary forms that we conventionally
think of as national currency. This is an implicit acknowledgement of
the fact that the new forms of money are not currencies. I would argue
that ‘‘money’’ is a broader and more complex category than ‘‘currency’’.
Currency constitutes the oﬀicial unit of account within the country, or
countries, in which it is legal tender. Currencies are produced by a sys-
tem of monetary governance. Usually ¢ but, as with the euro, not
necessarily ¢ this consists of a central bank that operates under the aus-
pices of a state. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a currency is
‘‘the money of a country in actual use’’. This deﬁnition confuses too
() For example, he argues that the trend
towards politically independent central banks
may have led to ‘‘technical’’ improvements, it
‘‘cannot restore the state’s monopoly privi-
lege’’ over the control of money (Cohen ,
p. ). In other words, governments may as
well accept that monetary policy will be an
increasingly poor instrument of macroeco-
nomic policy. In light of this, Cohen (ibid.,
pp. -) advocates a more robust, imagi-
native and ﬂexible use of ﬁscal policy as a
counterweight to the weakening eﬀectiveness
of monetary policy. He even suggests that ﬁscal
policy, too, could be placed in the hands of an




many issues. The following deﬁnition is more exact: ‘‘currency is legal
tender within a deﬁned geopolitical space’’. What Cohen calls ‘‘pure
territorial money’’ is not, strictly speaking, the same as ‘‘currency’’. The
whole point of his argument is that major currencies are increasingly
circulating beyond the legal jurisdiction of their issuing authorities. In
most cases of currency substitution they do so as legal tender, while in
others they simply enjoy a broad domain of legitimate use. In other
words, ‘‘pure territorial money’’ refers to a particular kind of currency,
namely, one which circulates exclusively within the legal jurisdiction of
its issuing authority. Cohen argues that this kind of currency is in
decline. This ¢ and only this ¢ is what he captures with the concept of
‘‘de-territorialization’’. Other forms of money which circulate alongside
currency may or may not constitute a threat to the monetary sovereignty
of nation-states. But if they do constitute a threat to monetary soverei-
gnty, it is not the same threat as currency internationalization and cur-
rency substitution. This is because they are not currencies. Cohen’s
argument is about the de-territorialization of currency, not money.
How should these other monetary forms ¢ electronic money and
complementary currencies ¢ be conceived? What is their status as
‘‘money’’? In the next two sections of this paper, I examine contrasting
answers to this question. One answer comes from Ingham, who regards
them merely as incomplete money. The other answer comes from Hart,
who argues that the emergence of these new monetary forms obliges us
to re-think our understanding of the nature of money.
Currency versus Money
Cohen argues that the growth of air miles, customer loyalty points
and LETS tokens is symptomatic of the increasing diversity of money.
But in light of debates about the nature of money, it is reasonable to ask
whether we should refer to such phenomena as ‘‘money’’ at all. Scholars
have long argued for the relative merits of competing deﬁnitions of
money. The question of how broad or narrow a deﬁnition of money
should be has been a particular feature of such debates. Concepts such as
‘‘near-money’’, ‘‘pseudo-money’’ and ‘‘limited-purpose money’’ have
been developed which refer to an asset, commodity or medium of
exchange that fulﬁls only some of the functions of money. Arguably,
the new monetary forms discussed in the preceding section occupy this
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grey area. They also raise the question of what criteria can be used to
decide whether or not something ‘‘qualiﬁes’’ as money. For example, air
miles and loyalty points have limited fungibility, and it is questionable
whether the people who use them even think of them as money. Com-
plementary currencies have a yet more restricted circulation, and even
some of their leading advocates reject the view that they are actually
forms of money. Perhaps ‘‘money’’ is not as diverse a phenomenon as
Cohen would have us believe. This is the standpoint taken by Ingham,
whose arguments are discussed in this section. In The Nature of Money
() and other articles, Ingham claims to be providing the ﬁrst full-
bodied sociological treatment of money. Moreover, he states that his
theory of money addresses ‘‘mainstream’’ issues which sociologists have
neglected, such as inﬂation, the control of the money supply, and so
on ().
Ingham’s argument revolves around the assertion that money is
deeply embedded in social structure. Hitherto, sociologists have focused
on monetary exchange in various ways, emphasising questions con-
cerning trust and meaning that arise whenever money is used. But the
production of money ¢ and not merely its use ¢ is a social process accord-
ing to Ingham (). The social production of money is integral to a
broader struggle for power ¢ or what Weber (, p. ; cited in
Ingham , p. ; , p. ) calls the ‘‘economic struggle’’. This
struggle determines the value of money. On one side of the struggle,
monetary agencies (banks, and so forth) contend to preserve and store
value in money, control its supply and extract interest. Against the
monetary agencies, industrialists ¢ the producers of commodities ¢
attempt to ‘‘monetize their market power’’ through rising prices or by
borrowing. These two protagonists are ‘‘distinct and relatively autono-
mous’’ (Ingham , p. ): each side ‘‘imposes limitations on, and
continually threatens to perturb or impede, the operation of the other’’
(Ingham , p. ). The state, mainly through its central bank and
ministry of ﬁnance, has its own special interests to defend. It thus
constitutes not only a ‘‘third corner of this triadic power struggle’’
(Ingham , p. ), but also the site on which the struggle takes place
(Ingham , p. ). Problems, such as inﬂation, arise whenever this
struggle becomes unstable. Thus the production of money involves a
‘‘continuous rebalancing of the power relations between economic
() Speciﬁcally, he argues that, hitherto,
sociologists have focused largely on discourse
about money, at the expense of what they see
‘‘as ‘economic’ problems, such as inﬂation, the
supply of credit, the determination of interest
rates, and so on’’ (Ingham , p. ; see also
, pp. -).
() As he puts it, ‘‘money itself is a social
relation’’ (Ingham , p. ; , p. ).
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interests’’ (Ingham , p. ): monetary policy is in this sense a
‘‘reinforcement of any balance of power that has been forged’’ (Ingham
, p. ).
Ingham (, p. ) goes on to argue that although money’s value is
determined by these competing interests, the deﬁnition of what counts as
money is declared by a political authority that transcends such interests.
In the modern era, this authority consists of the state, which uses its
power to ‘‘impose a hegemonic meaning’’ of money. The state does so by
deﬁning the unit of account ¢ or what Keynes (, p. ) calls money-
of-account ¢ for the money which circulates within its territory. Ingham
(, p. ) argues that this unit of account is vital to our under-
standing of the nature of money: money ‘‘is always an abstract claim or
credit whose ‘moneyness’ is conferred by a money of account’’.
Ingham’s deﬁnition of money is therefore twofold. First, he draws on
Simmel’s characterisation of money as a ‘‘generic promise to pay’’:
money is a unique form of credit because it expresses a relationship not
between two individuals but between every individual and the entire
‘‘society’’. Second, Ingham argues that only those promises to pay that
are denominated in the oﬀicial money-of-account can be thought of as
‘‘money’’. Only the state has the requisite authority to deﬁne a money-
of-account. Money is therefore ‘‘a form of sovereignty, and as such it
cannot be understood without reference to an authority’’ (Ingham ,
p. ).
It follows from this image of monetary relations that any form of
‘‘money’’ which is not denominated in the oﬀicial unit of account must
be deﬁcient in some way. Unoﬀicial money will be too specialised in
terms of its possible uses, and too restricted in its potential sphere of
circulation. Predictably, Ingham has little sympathy for arguments
about the diversity ¢ let alone the disintegration ¢ of money. He argues
that e-money is likely to have an extremely limited capacity for success
unless it is denominated in the oﬀicial money-of-account. And local
alternatives to currency are little more than media of exchange which
facilitate bartering. We might want to think of air miles and comple-
mentary currencies as ‘‘money’’, but they will never be complete money.
Indeed they match the anthropological notion of ‘‘limited-purpose’’
money. Ingham is in agreement with Cohen that the state’s role in
controlling money is being eroded to some degree: ‘‘globally from the
outside’’ by electronic money, and ‘‘locally from the inside’’ by local
monetary forms (Cohen , p. ; , p. ). But as long as states
are the world’s primary source of political authority, any monetary form
which is not denominated in a state-deﬁned unit of account can only be
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regarded as ‘‘partial’’ money. As such, forms such as e-money and
complementary currency can hardly be regarded as a major threat to the
hegemony of state-issued currency within the world’s money-ﬂows.
In some respects, this is an ingenious response to recent debates over
the changing nature of money. But while Ingham draws our attention to
the structural factors which are inherent in the production of money, his
analysis says relatively little about the everyday use of money. Similarly
to Cohen, he tends to regard the demand for money as if it was derived
only from ﬁnancial markets, banks and corporations. Of course, such an
emphasis is justiﬁed if one thinks only of the sheer volume of money
which is handled by these institutions. But there are grounds for arguing
that a fully sociological approach to the analysis of money should provide
a more sustained treatment of its everyday, or non-specialist, users.
Oddly enough, this ﬂaw in Ingham’s approach is most clearly exposed in
relation to a form of money which not even he could dismiss as ‘‘partial’’,
namely, the euro.
The euro does not ﬁt neatly into Ingham’s characterisation of money.
It is an oﬀicially prescribed ‘‘money-of-account’’ which has applied
throughout the twelve member-states of the euro zone since January
, even though euro notes and coins were not issued for another three
years. Yet in two key respects, the euro falls outside of Ingham’s
approach to money. Firstly, the euro is deﬁned as the ‘‘oﬀicial’’ unit of
account for the euro zone by a pool of twelve states, not a sovereign
political authority. Indeed, one of the problems that Ingham identiﬁes
with the euro is that there is no such authority within the euro zone
which can act as a counterweight to the independent European Cen-
tral Bank. He argues that the twelve member-states have eﬀectively
surrendered their sovereign control over the production of money to a
politically independent institution, the ECB. In time, these states will
need to wrest that authority back when domestic circumstances demand.
By implication, the options would be either to forge ahead towards a
fully-ﬂedged federalist political structure, or to fall back into a system of
twelve separate national currencies. Either prospect would leave
Ingham’s characterisation of money intact. But at present, the evidence
suggests that a more complex series of political arrangements are being
devised ¢ almost ad hoc ¢ between the key institutions within the euro
zone that are ensuring the longer-term success of the new currency.
Thus it seems that, for the time being at least, the world’s second major
currency is not ‘‘money’’ as Ingham would characterise it. A second
problem in Ingham’s approach is illuminated when it is used to examine
the euro. The euro is the official unit of account within the euro zone,
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but by no means the only unit of account as far as many of its users are
concerned. In most countries within the euro zone, the majority of those
who use the euro on an everyday basis still calculate in terms of their old
currencies when making both large and small purchases (). Dual pri-
cing still exists in several currencies, and many everyday users of the
new currency appear to want dual pricing to remain (). Thus for most
people within the euro zone, there is no single ¢ or hegemonic, as
Ingham puts it ¢ money-of-account. Rather, there are two, at least as far
as the users’ experiences with the new currency are concerned.
Ingham’s insistence that ‘‘complete’’ money is deﬁned by the oﬀi-
cially prescribed money-of-account glosses over the complexities that
are involved when we calculate in terms of money. The evidence that is
suggested by the euro so far indicates that there are other reasons ¢ not
just political authority ¢ why people use a speciﬁc unit of account within
monetary transactions. Convenience and familiarity come immediately
to mind. Ingham is therefore unjustiﬁed in insisting that ‘‘money’’ is
necessarily equivalent to the official money-of-account. He might
counter, of course, that the euro is an exceptional case: as with decima-
lization in Britain during the early s, the old money-of-account will
simply wither away. But a similar diﬀiculty arises in regard to Ingham’s
treatment of e-money. He maintains that e-money will not undermine
the hegemony of state-issued currency because it must be denominated
in the oﬀicial money of account in order to be widely accepted. This is
plainly untrue. One important feature of many forms of e-money is that
they have their own units of denomination: points, miles, and so forth.
These units are part of an autonomous accounting system in which the
schemes’ relationship to currency can vary (). Far from undermining
() According to a ‘‘Eurobarometer’’ survey
conducted in October-November , this is
especially so when large purchases are made:
across the EU-, % of those surveyed cal-
culate in euros when making purchases such as
a house or car, while a further % calculate in
both euros and their old national currencies.
But even in respect of smaller, everyday pur-
chases, % of those surveyed still calculate in
their national currencies, while a further %
calculate in both denominations (Eurobarmo-
ter Flash Survey no ).
() Signiﬁcantly, % of respondents
would prefer dual pricing to continue,
although this ranges widely across the euro
zone: the ﬁgure is as low as % in the
Netherlands, and as high as % in France.
Support for continued dual pricing correlates
positively with age and negatively with educa-
tional attainment (Eurobarmoter Flash Survey
no ).
() For example, speciﬁed amounts of
Nectar points can be exchanged for cash dis-
counts with another retailer (Argos), while also
being used to make outright purchases of dis-
crete items: thus , points equals a £
discount or two return ﬂights from the UK to
Paris; , points equals a £ discount or a
cordless drill; and , equals a £ discount
or two entry tickets to a theme park. In eﬀect,
members of such loyalty schemes can choose
whether to use their points in a similar way to
‘‘conventional’’ money, or to use them in a
much more speciﬁc way. This suggests that
perhaps the most signiﬁcant aspect of electro-
nic money is its potential impact on the ways in
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these schemes, the autonomous unit of account gives them a distinctive
character. If anything, Ingham’s interpretation of their relationship to
currency can be reversed. According to Lietaer (, p. ), for exam-
ple, the most successful electronic payments systems in the near future
are likely to be those which do not deal exclusively with national cur-
rency: in which ‘‘value’’ can be transmitted via a number of alternative
denominations. For the sake of consistency, Ingham might have argued
that e-money should not be referred to as ‘‘money’’ at all. What he
actually says, however, is that e-money and complementary currencies
are ‘‘incomplete’’ forms of money. Here is the rub. Most forms of
e-money, and most complementary currencies, are not denominated in
the oﬀicial money-of-account. But not even Ingham chooses to deny
that they are forms of ‘‘money’’. For this reason, his deﬁnition of money
as equivalent to the oﬀicially prescribed money of account ﬂakes away.
These observations reveal a deeper conceptual ﬂaw in Ingham’s
approach to money. All that he provides, in the ﬁnal analysis, is a deﬁ-
nition of currency. He does not oﬀer a convincing deﬁnition of money.
Even if one wants to agree that e-money and complementary currencies
are incomplete forms of money, they nevertheless fall outside of
Ingham’s deﬁnition. As I have already suggested, ‘‘money’’ is a broader
category than ‘‘currency’’. It is certainly more diﬀicult to deﬁne. If we
want to develop a broader and more ﬂexible approach to the concept of
‘‘money’’, we must search elsewhere.
Multiple Meanings, Multiple Monies
Let us look, then, at the arguments of Zelizer and Hart, who both
maintain that money is a diverse phenomenon and therefore impossible
to conceptualise on the basis of a single deﬁnition. Zelizer contends that
we need to develop ‘‘a diﬀerentiated model of money’’ (, p. )
which can account for its multiple forms. Likewise, Hart argues that
‘‘money today is more plural and dynamic than at any time previously’’
(, p. ). But the new monetary forms that have been discussed so
which money is perceived and used. According
to Lietaer (, p. ), electronic money
‘‘provides unprecedented opportunities for
rethinking the kind of money we want, and for
incorporating features to help address issues
our societies will be facing in the foreseeable
future’’. This presupposes, of course, that
people begin to think of the points they have
accrued on loyalty cards, and the air miles they
have accumulated through frequent ﬂying, as
forms of ‘‘money’’. It is open to doubt whether
many do so at the present time.
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far in this paper highlight a crucial diﬀerence between the two argu-
ments. Whereas the diversity of money as Zelizer conceives it is a
function of her perspective, Hart’s analysis concerns the changing
nature of money itself. It is the work of Hart that throws up more
challenging questions for the sociology of money.
Zelizer (, p. ) criticizes notions of money which portray it as a
‘‘homogenous, inﬁnitely divisible, liquid object, lacking in quality’’. She
conveys money as ‘‘multiple’’, i.e. as monies, not money. According to
Zelizer, the multiplicity of money derives from the diﬀerentiated ways in
which we impute meanings to it whenever it is in our possession. She
calls this process ‘‘earmarking’’. Earmarking works in a number of
interrelated ways: by restricting the use, regulating the allocation,
modifying the appearance, and attaching special meanings to a particu-
lar quantity of money (ibid., p. ). For instance, by allocating speciﬁc
quantities of our income to manage a domestic budget, or by setting
aside currency received as a gift for a speciﬁc purchase, we impute a
speciﬁc meaning to money which undermines its supposedly impersonal
character (ibid., p. ). Hence through earmarking, cultural and social
structures introduce ‘‘profound controls and restrictions on the ﬂow and
liquidity of monies’’ (ibid., p. ). Accordingly, Zelizer (b,
pp. -) oﬀers a wide-ranging and multi-faceted characterisation of
money:
International currencies, nationally issued legal tenders, electronic monies, bank
accounts, and other highly liquid tokens of transferable rights represent one
extreme of a continuum running from such generalized forms to the narrowly
limited circuits of such other monies as credits in baby-sitting pools, casino chips,
or investment diamonds.
Some of Zelizer’s critics have objected to this characterisation of
monies on account of its breadth (). The problem is not one of
breadth, however, but rather that her conceptual vocabulary is too slip-
pery. By demonstrating that, in terms of their social meaning, ‘‘not all
dollars are the same’’ (ibid., p. ), Zelizer’s approach enables us to look
at money in a diﬀerent way. In other words, the ‘‘multiplicity’’ that she
describes is primarily a function of the perspective that she adopts as an
observer. Zelizer appears to concede as much when defending her
arguments against the criticisms of Fine and Lapavitsas:
() For example, Fine and Lapavitsas
(, p. ) argue that ‘‘Zelizer oﬀers no
deﬁnition of money at all’’ but merely oﬀers ‘‘a
broad range of examples’’. They refer to these
examples as a ‘‘chaotic ensemble’’ (ibid.,
p. ). On a diﬀerent tack, Ingham (,
p. ) argues that ‘‘the social earmarking of
money for speciﬁc purposes... could not occur
unless uniform money existed’’. Persumably,




All moneys are actually dual: they serve both general and local circuits... Seen from
the top, economic transactions connect with broad national symbolic meanings and
institutions. Seen from the bottom, however, economic transactions are highly dif-
ferentiated, personalized, and local, meaningful to particular relations. No
contradiction therefore exists between uniformity and diversity: they are simply
two diﬀerent aspects of the same transaction. (Zelizer b, p. , italics
added)
This statement suggests that to focus on earmarking is to take a
‘‘micro’’ as opposed to a ‘‘macro’’ approach to the analysis of money. In
contrast to the approach that is taken by Ingham, it is to look at currency
from the perspective of its users, not its producers. By adopting this
perspective, one can glean many insights from the ﬂuid meanings of
money. But if earmarking renders money meaningful, it does not
necessarily transform it in any fundamental way. In other words, while
earmarking explains the multiplicity of money’s meaning, it cannot
account for the diversity of monetary forms that circulate in the present
day. Zelizer does suggest that money can and does assume a diverse
number of forms. The inventory of monies that she provides makes this
clear (). But while monetary forms such as casino chips and baby-
sitting tokens may be earmarked by their users, this by itself cannot
explain how such forms come to be used and regarded as ‘‘money’’ in the
ﬁrst place. Given the diversity of forms that Zelizer includes in her
deﬁnition, what do these speciﬁc forms have in common that entitles us
to regard them as ‘‘money’’? Zelizer does not directly address this
question. But an answer of sorts is implied by her argument that
‘‘monies certainly include oﬀicially issued coins and bills, but they also
include all objects that have recognised regularised exchange value in
one social setting or another’’ (ibid., p. ). Thus ‘‘money’’ might include
‘‘tokens and commercial paper to art objects, and even including kitchen
recipes or jokes’’ (ibid., p. ) ¢ as long as someone recognises such
objects as money. We are in danger of running in circles.
Expressed in Zelizer’s terms, the claim that money has become
increasingly diverse in terms of its form suggests that there is no general
circuit to which an equally generalised form of ‘‘money’’ corresponds.
Rather, a number of specialised circuits have emerged, each of which
has acquired its own speciﬁc monetary form. These forms circulate
alongside state-issued currency. Their creation therefore raises a more
far-reaching set of sociological questions than does earmarking alone. In
() Zelizer’s analysis could be strengthened
by distinguishing between money and currency.
Most of the examples of earmarking that she
cites apply to currency: they add colour to the
US dollar. But how are monetary forms that
are not denominated in oﬀicial currency crea-
ted? It seems doubtful whether this can be




order to explore the implications of this creation, we must turn to the
recent work of an anthropologist, Hart.
On one level, Hart’s analysis of the changing nature of money
concurs with that of Cohen. Hart (, p. ) states that, today,
money ‘‘is more plural and dynamic than at any time previously’’.
Unlike Cohen, he draws attention to the fact that an increasing number
of the monetary forms which circulate in the present day are not cur-
rencies:
Dictionaries [concentrate] on the money form itself, which they usually refer to as
‘‘currency’’, whatever is in circulation: coins, banknotes and other instruments
issued by governments. But then what about personal checks and savings
accounts, private notes of bank credit and, more recently, plastic cards of all kinds
linking us into electronic networks that greatly increase our spending options? The
money form is not standing still. (ibid., p. )
Whereas Cohen’s analysis is underpinned by the idea of currency
competition, Hart’s argument is premised on the impact of what he calls
the ‘‘communications revolution’’. This revolution primarily consists of
the computerisation of communication and market processes, particu-
larly the growth of Internet commerce (). Hart’s argument focuses on
the development of computerised trading networks, and on their
implications for individuals and local communities. It is this aspect of
his approach, and the characterisation of money which he derives from
it, that is most intriguing from a sociological point of view.
With regard to currency, Hart agrees that the state’s role in the pro-
duction of money is being eroded. However, his investigation focuses
less on the diﬀiculties that this erosion presents to governments ()
than on their implications for everyone else. He appears to reject the
view that money necessarily requires the support of a sovereign political
body in order to be widely accepted. It is only the modern pre-eminence
of state capitalism, he alleges, which has made such an arrangement
appear inevitable and even ‘‘natural’’. In a similar way to Zelizer, Hart
also rejects the tendency among scholars to conceive of monetary rela-
tions as inherently impersonal. But whereas Zelizer locates her argu-
ment in the social meanings that monetary exchange inevitably acquires
() As he states, ‘‘[t]he great potential of the
Internet is not restricted to the money form in
a narrow sense, but lies rather in the expansion
of electronic markets, in borderless trade at the
speed of light. For electronic money will
develop to the extent that it is needed for such
trade’’ (ibid., p. ).
() He does not completely ignore this
issue. For example, he argues that the recent
predominance of nation-states in the produc-
tion and management of currency ‘‘is rapidly
giving way, under pressure from the interna-
tional economy, to a phase where money mar-
kets, oﬀshore banking and electronic payment
systems have sharply reduced the autonomy of
national governments’’ (ibid., p. ). Here
again, his analysis concurs with that of Cohen.
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through earmarking, Hart’s position is cast in terms of the historical
emergence of electronic money (). He argues that digitalised forms of
money are a decentralising force within markets for both consumer
goods and ﬁnancial products. Mainly through the Internet, consumers
are being oﬀered a diverse range of media through which to pay for
goods or attain credit. In this way, e-money is increasingly being mani-
fest as personal credit. According to Hart, money is thereby being
transformed into an entity whose production ¢ contra Ingham ¢ we can
control. In other words, money is ceasing to be an ‘‘object’’ which exists
outside of us. In Hart’s view, this presents a challenge to conventional
understandings of economic agency: power is being transferred from the
producers of money to the users themselves.
Hart’s arguments are suggestive, but speculative. For example, his
contention that the growing range of available ways in which to pay with
(and borrow) money necessarily equates with a transfer of economic
power away from states and corporations requires detailed empirical
scrutiny. While Hart is encouraged by the ‘‘subversive’’ potential of so
much activity that takes place through the Internet (e.g. p. ), one
wonders just how far this can impact on the seemingly irresistible power
of ﬁnancial markets. But as Hart himself makes clear, he is not sugges-
ting that money is being re-personalized in all of its forms. State cur-
rency is and will remain the dominant form of money, although it is
undoubtedly losing its monopoly over the world’s monetary system. If
anything, the analysis he proposes is a dialectical one. That is to say, the
development of e-money can act as a counterweight to the growth of
ﬁnancial markets, generating a form of currency competition which is
driven by consumers rather than by institutional elites:
[...] any moves towards more personalised forms of money will co-exist with those
that are already dominant. A large number of transactions, involving people and
institutions around the world, will have the need of a money or moneys that
have wide acceptability both as money-of-account and as money-proper, to use
Keynes’s terms. At present the dollar and, to a lesser extent, some other national
currencies play such a role; and this has been enhanced by the ﬁnancial turbulence
in East Asia, Russia and elsewhere during the late s. (ibid., p. )
According to Hart, one of the most important characteristics of
electronic money is the way in which it transmits information. In eco-
nomics, the information that is transmitted by money has conventionally
been understood as consisting of abstract price signals which enable
() In the context of Hart’s argument,
e-money primarily consists of money that is
produced by corporations. However, he notes
that local alternatives to currency are begin-
ning to circulate in electronic form, and sug-
gests that they are more likely to be successful
as a result of this.
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markets to clear. But e-money transmits information that is considerably
more personalised than anything that could be conveyed through price
alone. According to Hart, classically modern conceptions of money as an
anonymous medium of exchange have been undermined not only by the
increasing diversity of money but also by a fundamental change in the
nature of the monetary form. Increasingly, monetary transactions are
traceable: not just in terms of the amount which has changed hands but
also in terms of the preferences of buyers. ‘‘Loyalty’’ cards oﬀer an
outstanding example of this development, enabling corporations to
manipulate sophisticated detailed data about their customers’ buying
behaviour. According to Hart, the application of this technology within
decentralised markets has the potential to transform money from an
impersonal medium of exchange to ‘‘an act of remembering, a way of
keeping track of the exchanges we each enter into’’ (ibid., p. ). If such
a potential is realised, money will act as a perpetually mobile testimony
to our participation in a diverse range of specialised payments networks.
Indeed, this is as close as Hart comes to providing a general deﬁnition of
money. It is ‘‘an instrument of collective memory’’ (ibid., p. ): a
memory bank which tracks a diverse range of social exchanges that are
mediated by increasingly specialised monetary forms ().
Hart’s characterisation of money as an instrument of collective
memory invites us to imagine the myriad potential ways in which money
might be appropriated by individuals and communities. His primary
aim is to decouple our understanding of money from a particular
conception of the market as autonomous (); and by doing so, to
encourage more creative interpretations of the nature of money
itself (). In addition, he seeks to decouple our interpretation of money
from a particular conception of society. According to Hart (,
p. ), money is a ‘‘token of society’’. But he uses a diﬀerentiated
concept of ‘‘society’’ in order to elaborate this claim. He notes that
‘‘society’’ has three distinct senses within the sociological and anthro-
pological literature on money: as state, nation and community. All three
senses imply a critique of the conventional ‘‘commodity’’ theory of
() Hart (ibid., p. -): ‘‘we should
look for the meaning of money in the myriad
acts of remembering that link individuals to
their communities. In this interpretation, the
need to keep track of proliferating connections
with others is mediated by money in its many
forms as the principal instrument of collective
memory’’.
() Speciﬁcally, he associates this con-
ception with state capitalism, and argues
that this system of political economy is in
decline.
() Of course, Hart’s analysis rests on some
debateable assumptions about the future tra-
jectory of Internet commerce, and of the
potential impact of the Internet on local
exchange schemes and other payments
networks. But the aim of this paper is not to




money by suggesting that ‘‘money is a symbol of something intangible,
an aspect of human agency, not just a thing’’ (ibid., p. ). Moreover,
each concept of ‘‘society’’ yields a distinctive conception of the inter-
relationship between money and social structure. When viewed as a
creature of the state, money is conveyed as a tool of power which
expresses ‘‘vertical relations between unequals, rulers and rules, like the
top and bottom two sides of the coin, heads and tails’’ (ibid., p. ). By
contrast, when ‘‘society’’ is taken to mean community, money’s depen-
dence on trust is underlined. This locates the source of monetary value
within ‘‘horizontal’’ relations between members of a community. The
association of money with nation combines these vertical and horizontal
interpretations, i.e. ‘‘the formality of the state with the informal sub-
stance of community’’ (ibid., p. ). Hart’s analysis of e-money and
local alternatives to currency leans strongly towards the interpretation of
society as ‘‘community’’. But he does not exclude the two other senses of
the term. Thus one might imagine that ‘‘society’’ should be rendered
as ‘‘state’’ or ‘‘nation’’ where the sociological analysis of currency is
concerned. This, of course, is exactly the approach which is taken by
Ingham.
Both Zelizer and Hart suggest that money is a more multifaceted
phenomenon than sociologists and anthropologists have conventionally
admitted. Each scholar resists the association of money with an abstract,
impersonal market. Zelizer’s monies are rendered multiple by virtue of
the meanings that are attached to them in the context of their use. But
she does not advance a robust concept of money. Her argument therefore
leaves sociologists with little choice but to describe the various forms of
money which are in circulation without thinking through what ‘‘mone-
tary’’ features they have in common. By contrast, Hart’s monies are
multiple as entities in their own right. But there is a signiﬁcant weakness
in his approach. Although he often writes of the diversity of ‘‘money’’ in
a general sense, his argument stands out in its emphasis on the diversity
of monetary forms that circulate in the present day (). He does not
distinguish between cases in which the monetary form in question is
denominated in the oﬀicial currency, and cases in which it is not. Hart
() For example, he argues that most of us
have access to six diﬀerent kinds of money:
coins, banknotes, cheques, savings accounts
and plastic credit and debit cards (ibid., p. ).
Although he suggests that ‘‘the relative signi-
ﬁcance of all of these is constantly shifting’’
(ibid., p. ), he regards all such forms of
money as part of a broader-based trend
towards money’s dematerialisation: ‘‘money
has become dematerialised, losing any shred of
a claim that it is founded on the natural scarcity
of precious metals. Even the authority of sta-
tes, which stamped coinage and issued the
notes with which we are still most familiar as
money, cannot long survive the electronic
blizzard that is money in the age of the Inter-
net’’ (ibid., p. ).
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acknowledges that an increasing number of monetary forms are not
denominated in oﬀicial currency. But he does not recognise the full
implications of this. For example, many LETS activists have resisted
government attempts to levy taxes on transactions within their schemes
by creating an accounting system which is diﬀicult to convert into cur-
rency. There is even, in some instances, a refusal to refer to such tokens
as money so that the transactions mediated by them are not classiﬁed as
‘‘monetary’’ for taxation purposes (Hart , p. ). This deﬁnitional
issue has made the literature on LETS somewhat perplexing in
conceptual terms. But it merely reﬂects wider confusions about the
nature of ‘‘money’’ ¢ as opposed to ‘‘currency’’ ¢ in general.
Hart advances some thought-provoking arguments about how we
might conceive of new monetary forms such as e-money. But his des-
cription of money as an instrument of collective memory cannot be
applied in a general way. The use of anonymous forms of money such as
cash might be in decline, but is unlikely to disappear. His approach
therefore brings us no closer to answering the main question of this
paper: What is it about ‘‘money’’ that the various monetary forms have
in common? In the concluding section of this paper, I shall be proposing
an answer of my own.
Conclusion
Greater conceptual clarity can be brought to bear on the issues which
I have been discussing in this paper by examining diversity of ‘‘money’’
on two axes: in terms of the monetary medium on the one hand, and in
terms of money’s denomination on the other. All four scholars whose
work has been discussed in this paper conﬂate these two axes. The fact
that none of them draws a meaningful distinction between ‘‘money’’ and
‘‘currency’’ is symptomatic of this.
The ﬁrst axis on which money has diversiﬁed concerns one monetary
medium. This refers to the material qualities of money. According to
Ingham, such qualities should not enter into a sociological conception of
money. In his view, once money has been deﬁned as a generic promise to
pay that is denominated in ‘‘money-of-account’’, the material qualities
of actual forms of money are irrelevant. In other words, all money is
‘‘virtual’’ in principle. Ingham argues that monetary theory has always
been undermined by a fundamental category error between the speciﬁc
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form that is taken by ‘‘money-stuﬀ’’ and the more general quality of
‘‘money-ness’’ which all monetary forms have in common (). He has a
point. To be sure, we should not reduce our understanding of money to
the forms which it takes. But to insist on the irrelevance of ‘‘money-
stuﬀ’’ to a sociological understanding of money is mistaken. As Hart’s
analysis shows, the form in which money is conveyed can be vitally
important to its role and impact in society. The increasingly varied
nature of ‘‘money-stuﬀ’’ has aﬀected the relationship between money
and major social institutions such as the state and corporations.
Moreover, it inﬂuences how people use and think about ‘‘money’’ in
relation to their own lives and circumstances. A sociological approach to
money cannot ignore such issues.
There is second axis on which ‘‘money’’ has diversiﬁed: namely, as a
denomination. In Ingham’s view, the quality of ‘‘money-ness’’ is
conferred on a monetary form by virtue of the fact that it has been
denominated within a ‘‘money-of-account’’. Here again, he has a good
point. One of the key functions of money is to quantify value, and
money-of-account provides the abstract system of measurement which
makes this possible. But Ingham’s insistence that money-of-account
must be deﬁned by a sovereign authority such as the state is conceptually
unjustiﬁed and empirically misleading. To all intents and purposes,
Ingham has simply redeﬁned money as currency. As a consequence of
this, he is bound to underplay the signiﬁcance of alternatives to cur-
rency, and his scepticism towards the euro can come as no surprise.
Empirically, as Hart’s analysis shows, ‘‘money’’ circulates in a variety of
denominations today. There is no compelling reason to assume that
forms of money which are not denominated in the oﬀicial currency are
bound to fail. After all, the period during which states have enjoyed a
monopoly over the production of ‘‘money’’ ¢ and in which currencies
have therefore been the only forms of ‘‘money’’ worthy of note ¢ has
spanned barely two hundred years.
Sociologically speaking, arguments about the diversity of money
must be placed in proper perspective. Along both axes ¢ monetary
medium on the one hand, and monetary denomination on the other ¢
diversiﬁcation brings with it some variable consequences for the dif-
ferent parties with a stake in the production and use of money. Consider
the state, for example. The circulation of currency in an increasingly
dematerialised medium presents serious diﬀiculties for monetary policy,
whereas the circulation of monetary forms in other denominations raises
() He argues that this is ‘‘a basic category
error, which... has persisted since the classical
Greek commodity theory of metallic coinage’’
(Ingham , p. ).
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formal (or legal) issues of monetary governance. But contrary to the
argument of Cohen, the diversiﬁcation of money is not simply an issue
for governments. Some communities, particularly in impoverished
regions, have much to lose from the internationalization of currency.
And as Hart observes, they may have a considerable amount to gain from
the development of electronic money. Whatever Ingham might say, the
‘‘social production’’ of money cannot be reduced to a ‘‘struggle’’
between the industrial and ﬁnancial elites.
If money has diversiﬁed as medium and as denomination, what does
this imply for a more general conception of ‘‘money’’? In this paper,
I have considered some richly contrasting ways of describing money.
But of the four scholars whose work I have discussed, only Ingham seeks
to provide an overarching definition of money. His deﬁnition is ﬂawed
because it excludes monetary denominations that now circulate along-
side currency. Nevertheless, Ingham’s strategy does suggest a way
forward towards a more coherent sociological concept of money. In an
earlier article, Ingham deﬁnes ‘‘money-of-account’’ as ‘‘a conceptual
scheme for the measurement of value, which lies behind any particular
form that [money] might take as a means of payment’’ (Ingham ,
p. ). In order to embrace the full diversity of ‘‘money’’, this deﬁnition
must be abstracted from its Keynesian roots and decoupled from the
state. But this requires a rather diﬀerent conception of what is entailed
in a ‘‘theory’’ of money than that which is envisaged by Ingham.
The abstract deﬁnition of ‘‘money-of-account’’ that is cited above
has some striking aﬀinities with Simmel’s ‘‘pure concept’’ of money. For
Simmel (, p. ), the essential idea of money is that it provides ‘‘a
system of measurement’’ against which all values can be quantiﬁed. In
this sense, money is a ‘‘stable pole’’ (). But at this ‘‘ideal’’ level,
monetary denomination does not ‘‘lie behind’’ monetary medium in the
way that Ingham suggests. Rather, they coincide. Crucially, Simmel
contrasts money’s ideal durability with its actual ﬂuidity. In his view,
money is not only the stable pole but also the actus purus, i.e. ‘‘a means of
exchange which moves between tangible objects as does ether between
object possessing weight’’ (ibid., p. ). As Hart describes it, Simmel’s
interpretation of the unique role of money rests on the view that it
‘‘represents an element of coherence in a world of constantly shifting
prices’’ (ibid., p. ). According to Hart (, p. ), money is not
‘‘one static thing or idea’’. He is right about the status of money as a
() He writes: ‘‘money as abstract value
expresses nothing but the relativity of things
that constitute value; and, at the same time...
money, as the stable pole, contrasts with the
eternal movements, ﬂuctuations and equations
of the objects’’ (ibid., p. ).
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‘‘thing’’. But as an idea, money is remarkably durable in one vital res-
pect. For all the diversity of monetary media and denominations, Sim-
mel’s concept of money suggests that there is one feature that they have
in common: they enable us to transform qualitative relations between
values into quantitative ones. Whether money possesses paper or plastic
form ¢ and whether it is denominated in US dollars, Ithaca hours, air-
miles or Nectar points ¢ all monies enable diﬀerent qualities to be
compared in quantitative terms. In this respect, Simmel’s approach to
money has not lost its edge ().
Simmel’s analysis can embrace arguments about the diversity of
money because it works on a generic level. As an idea, Simmel’s concept
of money presents a conceptual limit-edge against which all forms of
money develop and take shape, however diverse they might be. For
Simmel, money in its purest form is inﬁnitely fungible: it can be
exchanged with anything and everything. Money thus serves as a uni-
versal means of quantifying value. But when conceived in this way,
‘‘money’’ can never empirically exist. Nevertheless, all of the monetary
forms which have been discussed in this paper ¢ large and small cur-
rencies, diﬀerent kinds of e-money, LETS tokens, Ithaca hours, and so
on ¢ can be classified as ‘‘money’’ according to Simmel’s deﬁnition. At
the same time, none of them are equivalent to ‘‘money’’. If not all dollars
are equal, to paraphrase Zelizer, then no dollar is perfect. Simmel’s
concept of money provides an ideal basis on which to treat money as a
generic category. As such, it provides the ﬂat surface on which the
complex contours of the contemporary monetary landscape can be
mapped out. The varying features of our monetary forms ¢ their fun-
gibility, trustworthiness, ease of use, level of anonymity, and so on ¢ can
then be explored without implying that some are superior, others infer-
ior. Whether idealised as collective memory or denigrated as socially
corrosive, ‘‘money’’ in its generic sense is a utopia ¢ a non-place where
form and idea coalesce. Little wonder that it has proved so elusive for
those who have sought to encapsulate it in theory.
() Dembinski and Perritaz (, p. )
are therefore mistaken when they argue that
what they call the ‘‘break-up’’ of money ren-
ders Simmel’s own treatment of money obso-
lete. Their suggestion that Simmel was trying
to understand the ‘‘essence’’ of money is
incompatible with the Kantian interpretation
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